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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite negotiation often being less costly, less contentious, and
less time-consuming than litigation,' it may not always lead to appro-
priate placements for children with disabilities, as required by law. 2
Take, for example, the case of a seventh grade girl, Beth, with Rett
syndrome. 3 Beth had no verbal abilities, and her estimated mental age
was between eighteen months and four years.4 Like her peers, she at-
tended English, Math, and Science classes every day, but the similarity
ended there.5 Beth looked at cards containing letters of the alphabet
with the help of an aide, while the class read novels; gazed at number
cards while her peers mastered pre-algebra; and stared at pictures of
clouds while her peers studied meteorology.6 At the annual meeting to
discuss Beth's Individualized Education Program (IEP),7 her parents
1. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF FORMAL DISPUTES
ARE GENERALLY Low AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATIONS AND OTHER STRATEGIES TO
RESOLVE CONFLICTS 1-2 (2003) (hereinafter GAO REP.), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03897.pdf.
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2005) (requiring that a student be placed in the "least restrictive
environment appropriate"). For the purposes of this paper, placements will be discussed in
terms of "appropriate." See generally Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs Into Round
Holes: Mediation and the Rights of Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 RUTGERS
L. REV. 333 (2001).
3. Hjortness ex rel. Hjortness v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1060, 1066 n.3 (7th
Cir. 2007). "Rett syndrome is a 'neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by normal early
development followed by loss of purposeful use of the hands, distinctive hand movements,
slowed brain and head growth, gait abnormalities, seizures, and mental retardation.'"
(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007)).
4. Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 2002).
5. Id. at 495-96.
6. Id.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004). IEPs are the key tool of the IDEIA, requiring that each
student with disabilities receive services and placements that are tailored to his or her
needs.
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asserted that Beth should remain in regular classes every day.8 The
school disagreed.9
Similar disagreements between parties - parents and school of-
ficials - over the placement of students with disabilities are not
uncommon, as every child with disabilities must be placed according to
individualized considerations. 10 As a result, parties frequently negoti-
ate disputes similar to this at IEP meetings or at pre-due process
hearing mediation sessions."
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
(IDEIA)12 requires that a child's educational placement be an "appro-
priate" one.13 For any given child, there should theoretically exist a
range of substantively appropriate placements.14 This spectrum repre-
sents the "bargaining zone"' 5 of placements within which the parents
and school would negotiate. Although the IDEIA encourages student
placements through IEP meeting agreements and also compels states
to offer mediation,16 there is no oversight or guidelines to ensure that
negotiated placements are, in fact, "appropriate." Parents and schools
often do not know which placements would be appropriate (or within
8. Beth B., 282 F.3d at 495.
9. See id. at 496.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2005).
11. GAO REP., supra note 1. Although many disputes arise over what services the
school will provide or what accommodations the school will make for the child with
disabilities, this Note focuses solely on disputes about children's placements, which
constitute the majority of litigated disputes. James R. Newcomber & Perry A. Zirkel, An
Analysis of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 ExCEPTIONAL CHILD 469, 478
(1999).
12. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (2005). The IDEIA was preceded by the Individuals With
Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. §1414 (1990)), the Education of All Handicapped
Children Act (Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)), and the Education for the
Handicapped Act (Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-685, 84 Stat. 175 (1970)). Like its
predecessors, the IDEIA governs the special procedural and substantive requirements for
educating students with disabilities, including such topics as classroom placements,
specialized services, and parental and school involvement in determining the appropriate
placement and services for a child.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2005).
14. Substantively appropriate placements vary from child to child, but are those in
which a child receives educational benefit in the least restrictive environment available.
See, e.g., Marchese, supra note 2, at 335.
15. The bargaining zone is the distance between what each negotiating party would be
willing to accept from the negotiation. RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND
STRATEGY 34 (2002). For example, in the selling of a car, if the owner would not sell for less
than $10,000 and the buyer would not pay more than $12,000, then the bargaining zone
would be that area between the two amounts.
16. Mediation is provided at no cost to the schools or parents and is often quicker and
less costly than court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005).
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the bargaining zone).' 7 As a result, negotiation may result in mis-
placement of the student or needless disputes due to parties'
uncertainty about where the zone lies.' 8
In Beth's case, the parents demanded an inappropriate place-
ment (the regular classroom) for their daughter.' 9 Assume that the
school had suggested the least restrictive "appropriate" placement, for
instance, the special education classroom, and that the parties had
then negotiated to a middle ground: a half day placement in special
education classes and a half day in regular classes. The placement ne-
gotiated would have been beyond the range of appropriate placements,
or beyond the "bargaining zone" for an IDEIA negotiation.
Mediation may generate appropriate educational placements
for children with disabilities in some cases, but the process does not
ensure that substantively appropriate placements for children result.
The IDEIA is designed to allow parties to settle student placement dis-
putes through mediation. 20 However, this assumes that parties
understand what sorts of placements would be "appropriate" for the
child and that they will consider the child's best interests, rather than
their own interests as agents for the child. Parties may not have a
common understanding of what mediation is for, how to prepare for
mediation, or what considerations should determine the parameters of
the bargaining zone. This can result in them making substantively
bad agreements-ones that are outside the "bargaining zone" of "ap-
propriate" placements. To enable parties to negotiate appropriate
placements for children with disabilities, the Department of Education
should establish guidelines for appropriate placement options for chil-
dren based on disability, social and academic abilities, and age.
To explain why mediation is inappropriate for making place-
ment decisions, this Note will begin with an explanation of the IDEIA,
its requirements in terms of mediation, and the manner in which these
negotiations are carried out. It will then present the problems with
negotiating placements, specifically the lack of an identifiable bargain-
ing zone, the parties' skills to negotiate, and the substantively
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004) (setting forth the requirement that the placement and
services for each child be determined on an individual basis and without substantive
guidelines, and so not using placements of other children as guidelines).
18. Appropriate placements are often unknown at the time of an initial IEP meeting,
as evidenced by the law's requirements that the parties work together to determine what an
appropriate placement will be and the many disputes that arise after those placements do
not work out. See, e.g., Beth B., 282 F.3d at 495 (7th Cir. 2002); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983).
19. See Beth B., 282 F.3d at 495.
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2005).
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inappropriate placements that can result. This Note will conclude with
suggestions for improving the efficiency of the placement decision-
making process by improving parties' understanding of negotiation
and by providing guidelines to serve as an objective starting point for
negotiation.
II. THE IDEIA's REQUIREMENTs-WHY THESE ARE NOT ALWAYS
MET THROUGH MEDIATION
The IDEIA mandates mediation for parents and schools in dis-
putes that cannot be resolved at IEP meetings. 21 The parties can
either opt for voluntary mediation or will have a mandatory mediation
as a step in the pre-trial stage. 22 Although the IDEIA requires place-
ments to be those that are "appropriate" for children, 23 thus suggesting
that an appropriate placement exists for each child, mediation may not
discover such a placement. Negotiating placements can be a conten-
tious process in which one or both parties use power to effectuate their
goals. 24 The use of power can be a beneficial strategic tool in some
negotiations. 25 However, in placement disputes, the use of power leads
to distrust and commitments where none need exist.26 One party's use
of power can undermine reasoned discussion and exchange of informa-
tion that could lead to an appropriate placement decision. The
differences in the interests of parents, schools and the child himself
can also contribute to the agents agreeing upon placements that are
inappropriate. 2 7
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (2005).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2005).
24. Demetra Edwards, New Amendments to Resolving Special Education Disputes: Any
Good Ideas?, 5 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 137, 148 (2005) (noting that the short time frame in
which to resolve formal complaints regarding student placements can be used as "a possible
delay and pressure tactic"); see also David Kirp & Donald Jensen, What Does Due Process
Do?, 73 PUB. INT. 75 (1983) (recognizing early on that disputes between parents and schools
regarding students with disabilities could become contentious).
25. Power in negotiations is the ability to "bend the opponent to your will." KOROmIoN,
supra note 15, at 151-56. Thus, for example, if a consumer goes to an electronic store to buy
a stereo, he is expected to pay ticket price for that stereo, and he may lack bargaining power
to do otherwise. However, if he brings with him a competitor's advertisement showing he
can get the same stereo for less, the first electronics store might give him a discount on the
stereo. The consumer's use of the ad to convince the electronics store to change its price
would be a successful use of power.
26. See Edwards, supra note 24, at 149 (noting issues of distrust between parents and
schools having been recognized by Congress); Interview with J.L.H., Teacher, (Nov. 20,
2008) (explaining that parents often disregard the advice of counselors because of distrust of
school employees' motives).
27. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d 1396, 1400 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994).
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A. The IDEIA Requirement of Negotiation/Mediation
Parents and schools go through many stages of negotiation over
the course of their dealings. 28 IEP meetings are the primary forum for
making decisions regarding a child with disabilities. 2 9 The law re-
quires that schools and parents devise the IEP together and that both
parties sign off on the accommodations, services, and placements
agreed upon. 30 When the parties do not agree on such issues at IEP
meetings, they can either go through voluntary mediation or opt for a
due process hearing, which is preceded by mandatory mediation.3 '
Formal mediation is required for many reasons, but primarily because
it is considered less contentious (and therefore better for children) and
less costly (and therefore a more efficient use of public monies) than
litigation. 32
Mediation is also useful in determining placements for children,
as it allows the strengths of each party to be put to use in determining
a child's placement: school officials possess more expertise in the field
of education, 33 while parents know their children better.34 The re-
quirement of parent participation in IDEIA decisions, at IEP meetings,
and in mediation is designed to encourage information exchange and
cooperative decision-making.
Finally, as both the parents and the school represent the same
client-the child 3 5-the law suggests that negotiating a placement
should result in a suitable one, as the parties share the mutual interest
of placing the child appropriately. 36 This is not always the case as par-
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2005) (requiring at least annual IEP meetings involving
parents and educators); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(a)(3)(ii) (2006)
(making mediation available at some stages of placement decision-making).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2005) (requiring that parents and schools work to identify
mutually agreeable placements and services for each child with disabilities).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005).
31. 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(a)(3)(ii) (2006). Though such
mediation was previously available to the parties at their own expense, the 1997 and 2004
Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) mandated that
states offer and cover the costs of mediation.
32. GAO REP., supra note 1, at 18.
33. See Beth B., 282 F.3d at 496 (7th Cir. 2002).
34. There are 6.5 million placements each year, but only twenty-one disputes total per
10,000 students with disabilities. GAO REP., supra note 1, at intro.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005). Under the IDEIA, either the school or the parent may
bring a claim if the other party will not agree to a placement decision, in order to get the
dispute before an impartial hearing officer.
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2005) (requiring that parents and schools attempt to
work out disputes on their own, without a mediator, and therefore assuming that these
parties can determine what is best for the child).
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ents and schools, as agents for the child, are often saddled with the
common agency-principal problem of differing interests.37 These
agents' differing interests may interfere with them choosing a place-
ment that is in the child's best interest-one that is within the
bargaining zone of appropriate options.38 Schools may be tempted to
focus on minimizing costs and on utilizing placements already availa-
ble in their districts. On the other hand, parents may be tempted to
seek the most expensive, cutting-edge option available on the market,
or may be overly protective or blindly optimistic about their children to
the point of not recognizing their child's abilities or limitations in the
school setting.39 Thus, the child's best interests may be overlooked as
the child's agents negotiate based on their own interests.
The law focuses on the procedural requirements of negotiating
at IEP meetings and at formal mediation, such as who must be present
and how often these interactions must occur,40 possibly to the detri-
ment of the child. Such meetings are unguided, as the placement that
parties agree to for the child go before no uninvolved third party for
consideration or approval. 4 1 Rather, it is assumed to be an appropriate
placement simply because the procedural requirements were met.4 2 It
is of no concern whether the agreement was reached because the
agents' interests were satisfied or because the child's were. While the
law also requires that the placement agreed upon be reasonable, it fails
to ensure that it is.43 The procedural requirements overshadow the
ultimate goal-ensuring the child is appropriately placed.
37. KOROKIN, supra note 15, at 311-12.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Beth B., 282 F.3d 493.
40. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (2000). See also M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634,
646 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding absence of a regular education teacher at an IEP meeting a
significant violation of the law).
41. Mark D. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals With Disabilities Education
Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REv. 7, 31 (2006).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2005). The IDEA does not indicate to parties how a
reasonable placement is determined, except to say that a reasonable placement is one in the
"least restrictive environment" "appropriate."
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2005).
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B. Negotiation Styles and Strategies Used at IEP Meetings and in
Mediation and the Problems with These Tactics
1. At IEP Meetings
Yearly IEP meetings involving parents and educators represent
the first stage of negotiation, 44 and these meetings often set the stage
for how discussion and negotiation will proceed in the future. Most
IEP meetings end in placement agreements, 45 but these agreements
involve no third party judgment. 4 6 Thus, the law assumes that be-
cause parents and educators are both in a position to represent the
child's best interest, such placements will be appropriate. This is prob-
ably true most of the time, but the use of power by either party, the
lack of information disclosure between them, or a focus on their own
interests over the child's can lead to inappropriate placements. If, for
example, the parents of a child who has been in special education all
day are particularly concerned about their child being with non-dis-
abled children for part of the day, then the school could offer that the
child spend lunch and P.E with non-disabled children. This placement
would require fewer school resources than educating the child specially
and would give the child more time with non-disabled children, as
mandated by the law and desired by parents.
Moreover, IEP meetings are not contentious and involve par-
ents reviewing and making suggestions to the IEP presented by the
school.47 At such meetings parties can use integrative bargaining to
discover opportunities for beneficial compromises and concessions.
They can also effectively negotiate the details using logrolling in order
to get what they each want and to achieve a good outcome for the child.
Unfortunately, parties at many IEP meetings are less coopera-
tive and instead attempt power plays to achieve their goals. IEP
meetings are intended to be cooperative opportunities for parents and
educators to make choices for the child, yet parties' use of power in
negotiating breeds negativity and inhibits good decision-making. 48
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005).
45. GAO REP., supra note 1, at 2 (noting that nationwide in 2000 there were only five
due process hearings, ten state complaints, and seven mediations per 10,000 disabled
students).
46. Weber, supra note 41.
47. GAO REP., supra note 1.
48. Id.; See generally Beth B., 282 F.3d at 497-99; Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217-18 (3d
Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); Daniel R.R. v.
State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048-50 (5th Cir. 1989); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058
Vol. 5:1:6168
2009 WHY NEGOTIATING IDEIA PLACEMENTS IS BAD
Parties at IEP meetings negotiate annually,49 making it likely that the
use of power and its associated bad will could inhibit cooperative nego-
tiation and beneficial agreement-making in the future as well.5 0
Schools and parents also can use the power tactic of patience.5 1
Because teachers' and administrators' time is limited, the school may
be tempted to present issues in a hurried manner that may push par-
ents to sign IEP forms without their input considered. 52 This implicit
impatience, suggesting superior authority on the part of the school,
may convince some parents that a quick decision is required, eliminat-
ing patience as a tactic and devaluing the parents' concerns. IEP
meetings may not cost parties anything except time; however, the
party with more time gains power.53 Parents, therefore, have a great
incentive to stand firm to demonstrate their unwillingness to agree un-
less their own suggestions are considered and included in the IEP. A
school may make concessions so that the meeting can be adjourned
before its overworked employees demand to be excused, as the IDEIA
has a procedural requirement that four school personnel be present at
the IEP meeting. 54 "Patience is a virtue" in some walks of life, but in
an IEP meeting, patience may be used as a power tactic. Thus, pa-
tience, or holding out, may lead to a less appropriate placement for the
child, if that is what the party wielding the power is seeking.
Parents and schools also use the power tactic of changing the
perception of the bargaining zone. Parties may alter the perceptions of
the bargaining zone either because they have aspirations beyond what
is reasonable (due to a focus on their own interests rather than those of
(6th Cir. 1983). In all of these cases, as in the thousands of placement decisions that go
through formal resolution proceedings, parents and/or schools each asserted power by
holding out rather than finding a compromise.
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004) (setting out IEP requirements, which include annual
review of the plan).
50. Perry A. Zirkel, et al., Creeping Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An
Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JumCIARY 27, 30 n.13 (quoting the Ninth
Circuit's criticism of contentiousness in special education disputes in Clyde K. v. Puyallup
Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d 1396, 1400 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994)).
51. GAO REP., supra note 1; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004). School officials and
teachers are often pressed for time and have to make dozens of IEP meetings a year, so they
are less likely to be willing to "wait it out" to compel agreement by the parents. Parents, on
the other hand, though busy as well, have only one IEP meeting per year for their child,
making those hours spent negotiating relatively more important and making patience a
useful tactic.
52. Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations
with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIo ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 573, 630-31 (2004).
53. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 151-56.
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2004).
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the child) or because they are uncertain about either their own reser-
vation price ("RP") or that of their opponent.55 For example, parents
may propose or demand placements beyond those that would be appro-
priate, increasing the upper bounds of the bargaining zone. Most
parents are not experienced negotiators in the field of education, how-
ever, so they may be unlikely to ask for excessive services5 6 in order to
exercise power or to change the bargaining zone. They may ask for
them simply because they want their child to receive the best, most
expensive, or most cutting-edge service or placement available.5 7
Thus, parents may make unreasonable proposals without realizing
how these proposals may alter or expand the perceived bargaining
zone beyond what would result in an appropriate placement.58 Just as
parents might sometimes seek placements beyond the bargaining zone
of appropriate placements, schools might lowball parents, offering less
than the child should receive under the law. Schools, being cost-con-
scious, are likely to offer those programs or placements that already
exist, rather than creating new programs or placements for a single
child. By proposing placements outside the bargaining zone, the school
might shift parents' perceptions of where it lies. 5 9 In these cases of
shifted bargaining zones, the negotiation may seem successful even
where the child is inappropriately placed. Imagine, for example, that
the parents propose that their autistic child be placed in the regular
classroom at all times, even though the reasonable placement would be
a specialized school for the autistic. If the school makes this reasonable
suggestion, then during negotiations the school might be persuaded to
make concessions to move the placement decision toward a compro-
mise. The reverse is also likely to happen, with the parents making a
reasonable proposal and the school proposing something outside the
bargaining zone, thus altering the perception of the bargaining zone.
55. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 38-41, 57-63.
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2005). Students must receive services necessary to allow them to
benefit from school. For example, services may include transportation to a specialized
school, counseling services, speech-language pathology, physical and occupational therapy,
a one-on-one aide to accompany the child throughout the day, special resource classes or
teachers to assist the child with assignments or skill development, or modified instruction
or expectations from regular classroom teachers.
57. Just because a service or placement is appealing or offers a lot for children with
specific disabilities does not make it appropriate. See, e.g., Beth B., 282 F.3d at 495.
However, parents, being fierce advocates for their children, may seek out what sounds
promising statistically or in general despite it not being the right choice for their child.
58. See id.
59. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 93-94.
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Alternatively, parties may change the bargaining zone due to
uncertainty about their own RP or that of their opponent.6 0 If parties
do not know what placements would be reasonable, then they cannot
know where the bargaining zone is. The law is unclear about what
makes a placement "appropriate,"61 so both parents and schools are
often unsure what options to consider. Both parties' RPs should be
within the range of appropriate placements, but because there is no
substantive guidance about where the bargaining zone of appropriate
placements lies, they cannot necessarily set reasonable RPs represent-
ing placements that would serve the child's best interests.
Another power tactic parents and schools employ is that of mak-
ing commitments. Parents, especially the wealthier and more
educated, can threaten to sue if the school does not meet their de-
mands. 62 This empowers parents to threaten to refuse to sign the IEP
form unless their ideas are incorporated or their demands are met. Be-
cause the school is under federal mandate to create an IEP for each
child within a specified time frame,63 parental refusal to consent can
pressure schools to give in to demands that they otherwise would ig-
nore.64 In either event, the power that parents would wield over
schools may induce schools to agree to placements that are not educa-
tionally appropriate for the child-placements outside the "bargaining
zone."
Schools may also use commitment as a power tactic,65 which
can result in similarly inappropriate educational placements for chil-
60. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 38-41, 57-63.
61. See Megan Roberts, The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act: Why
Considering One Individual at a Time Creates Untenable Situations for Students and
Educator, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1057-72 (Apr. 2008) (discussing the circuit split over the
factors to use in determining the appropriateness of a placement, as evidenced in: Beth B.
v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 497-99 (7th Cir. 2002); Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel
H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217-18 (3d Cir.
1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); Daniel R.R. v. State
Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048-50 (5th Cir. 1989); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th
Cir. 1983)).
62. Dee Alpert, Tactics & Strategy in Mediations and Negotiations Dee Albert, http://
www.Harborhouselaw.com/articles/mediate.alper.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2007). In fact,
parent advocacy websites suggest that it is okay to "say things in mediations that aren't
true but may make the other side believe that you're going to cost them a fortune." This is
not particularly likely at such an early stage in the process of determining a child's
placement, for both parties have a lot to lose by being uncompromising (such as time,
money, goodwill, the child's educational best interests for the time being, etc.). If the
parents have a history of suing the school, however, it is more likely that such a threat could
be made and would be perceived as credible.
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2005).
64. See, e.g., M.L. v. FED. WAY SCH. DisT., 394 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005).
65. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 63.
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dren. Schools have a significant incentive to "stick to their guns" in
their initial offer,66 so that they do not set a precedent for giving in to
these parents or to others with whom they may negotiate in the future.
Thus the school may suggest that it cannot budge, despite the fact that
the placement might be inappropriate.
2. At Formal Voluntary and Mandated Mediations
Once parents and schools have failed to agree on a placement at
IEP meetings, the next step is either voluntary mediation or a feder-
ally mandated pre-trial settlement conference. 67 If the parties are
unwilling to mediate and instead prefer to take their dispute before a
hearing officer, they can then skip voluntary mediation.6 8 Regardless
of which option is taken, the pressure is on both parties to come to an
agreement, rather than to spend more time, incur greater costs, and
further injure their relationship.6 9 The placement agreed upon may be
substantially no better than what was proposed at the IEP meeting.
Despite the pressure for the parties to come to an agreement, both par-
ties also retain their original incentives to push for what they want and
may even believe they have more reason to do so.7o This can lead to a
misuse of power.
a. Use of Power
While both parents and schools have experience with IEP meet-
ings, schools generally have more experience with formal
negotiations. 7 ' This may allow a school to intimidate the parents by
66. Special educators must prepare a set of goals and a proposed IEP for a child before
the meeting. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2005). Regular classroom teachers are consulted in the
formation of the IEP, and the final product is that which is initially offered to the parents at
the IEP meeting. Id. While parents are supposed to be a part of the decision-making
process under the law, the author has witnessed that they often end up being walked
through an explanation of the goals of IEP and then are asked to sign the forms. As a result
of the overwhelming amount of information and the larger presence of school officials than
parents (four school personnel need to be present, while only one parent need attend (20
U.S.C. § 1414) (2005)), parents can get mired in the minor details, rather than demanding
other placement options. If a parent is fixated on the wrong points, the resulting placement
could be inappropriate.
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)-(f) (2005).
68. Id.
69. Zirkel, supra note 50.
70. See Edwards, supra note 24, at 152 (noting the difficulties in cooperative
negotiation that can result when the parties have previously engaged in contentious
negotiations).
71. Weber, supra note 41, at 31; Edwards, supra note 24, at 152-53. See generally GAO
REP., supra note 1. While any parent will negotiate on behalf of only a child or two with
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confidently framing its chances of prevailing in court or by discussing
the increased costs of going to court.72 Going to court would be the
parents', schools', and children's Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement ("BATNA"), because if the parties do not come to an infor-
mal and mutually agreeable resolution, litigation is the only real
option. 73 Schools have an incentive to pursue the dispute in court in
order to dissuade future litigation or threats of litigation. Parents
might view the school's commitment to go to court (if its offer is not
accepted) as a credible one, especially at this advanced stage. Parents'
inferior position in terms of power, experience and funds may lead
them7 4 to concede to a placement outside the "bargaining zone."
Similarly, parents, especially those that are wealthy who have
more resources, can make convincing commitments to take the dispute
to court to get their child placed as they see fit. Credible threats to go
to court could induce schools with tight budgets and reputational con-
cerns to give in to parents' demands, even when the parents seek an
unreasonable placement. Parents have an added incentive to hold out,
because if the dispute never gets to court, the parents cannot recoup
their attorney's fees.75 This makes parents' threats of going to court
convincing. Thus, the parties might again miss the chance to come to
an agreement on an appropriate placement,76 or the school could reach
an inappropriate one due to its aversion to going to court.
b. Risk preference considerations
Like the opponent's use of power, risk preferences can affect
parties' willingness to agree to placements outside the bargaining
disabilities, schools will be on the other side of the negotiating table in every case. As there
are millions of students with disabilities, schools have many opportunities to negotiate in
IEP meetings and mediations.
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2005). Potential costs include expert fees, for which parents do
not get reimbursed, lost wages during court time, attorneys' fees (if the school prevails) and
even the risk that the parents could end up having to pay for the school's attorney fees if the
parents have pursued a case which is found to have been harassing or frivolous.
73. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414, 1415 (2005). The child's BATNA and his agents' BATNA are
conveniently aligned, even though their preferences and interests may not be (as discussed
throughout). If the parties go to court, the case will be heard by an administrative law judge
(and if appealed, by a regular judge) who will consider the substantive appropriateness of
the placement options sought by the parties.
74. Edwards, supra note 24, at 152. This would be especially true of lower-income
parents, who are less able to take such financial risks.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(3) (2005); see also GAO REP., supra note 1, at 7.
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005). If the dispute goes to court, the impartial ALJ would likely
select an appropriate placement, but this increases the time necessary for appropriately
placing the child and the contentiousness of the parties' relationship.
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zone.77 Either party may concede whether the offered placement is ap-
propriate simply to avoid potential court costs. If parents and schools
are focused solely on their own interests, rather than on the child's,
then going to court may be better than any inappropriate placement,
since the administrative law judge would be available to select an ap-
propriate placement for the child. If the child were to remain more
inappropriately placed while awaiting a slow outcome in court than he
would if the parties made an agreement immediately, then going to
court might become less desirable for the child because of the costs of
lost education in the meantime. Nonetheless, the agents' risk prefer-
ences probably explain, in part, why only five of 10,000 formal IDEIA
disputes reach the hearing stage each year.7 8
c. Transaction cost! value of time considerations
Schools and parents must also consider the transaction costs
and time required to engage in disputes beyond the mediation or pre-
trial settlement conference. Depending on the strength of its case, the
parents or the school could end up agreeing to a placement outside the
bargaining zone because the costs of going to court are too great. A
school runs the risk of not only having to provide the placement de-
manded by the parents, but also having to pay the parents' attorney's
fees.79 At the point where the school has too much to lose, the school
might see its employees' time and its limited funds as too valuable to
risk in trying to win and accepting a less than appropriate placement
for the child might be better for the school. Likewise, in challenging
the child's future placement, parents must consider their child's cur-
rent placement, 0 the cost of going forward, and the time it will take to
get through a hearing. If the parents are arguing for the child to re-
main in the current placement, then the stay-put provision will be
advantageous. If the parents desire a different placement than the
child's current placement, however, then the longer the dispute drags
on, the longer the child will be stuck in the perceived inappropriate
placement. These risks may deter parents from pursuing more appro-
priate placements. Since these concerns are those of the parents and
77. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 68-69.
78. GAO REP., supra note 1, at 3.
79. Id. at 1. Dispute resolution cost schools over $90 million in the 1999-2000 school
year.
80. With the stay-put provision of the IDEA, children remain in the previously agreed
upon placement until the new placement is determined. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(j) (2005).
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the schools, and not of the child, this again demonstrates the potential
principal-agent problems that can arise in this context.a
d. Future transaction considerations
Finally, both parties know that in the future, they will have to
negotiate with one another again, as IEPs are reviewed and redrafted
at least annually. 82 Parties' knowledge that future interactions and
negotiations are certain should lead to civility;8 3 however, this does not
always happen.84 Each party has the incentive to fight hard to demon-
strate its commitment to its positions and its willingness to pursue its
BATNA. 85 Negotiating with a third-party moderator might remind
parties that they represent the same client and can make future trans-
actions less contentious if they agree without further dispute.86 Here
again, however, is the problem that parties might make an agreement
that is inappropriate in order to show good faith. Without guidelines,
even third party moderators will have trouble helping the parties to
shape an appropriate placement.
Mutual use of power, aligned risk preferences, mutual interest
in quick dispute resolution, and shared interest in limiting the conten-
tiousness often result in negotiated agreements at mediations and pre-
trial settlement conferences.87 If the negotiation hinges on money and
power, however, the child's best interests will become secondary. 8 Ne-
gotiating a child's placement, as if it were any other transaction, does
not adequately ensure an educationally successful result.89
81. KoRoBKIN, supra note 15, at 310-13; Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d 1396,
1400 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that in placement disputes such as the one at issue in this
case, "when combat lines are firmly drawn, the child's interests often are damaged in the
ensuing struggle"); Edwards, supra note 24, at 153.
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(4)(A)(i) (2005).
83. Parties' desire to establish a reputation for being tough might result in oppositional
behavior, which would be better than civility if the child's best interests in a given situation
were served by this behavior.
84. See, e.g., Alpert, supra note 62. At this stage, parties might already have become
too angry and self-righteous to deal professionally with one another.
85. See discussion infra section III.
86. KOROBIN, supra note 15, at 345-48.
87. GAO REP., supra note 1.
88. See supra note 85.
89. See discussion supra section II.
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III. THE PROBLEM: FAILURE TO ENSURE THAT PLACEMENTS
ARE APPROPRIATE
There is no outside review to ensure that the IDEIA placements
generated through negotiation will be educationally appropriate, save
for possible review by a court in the event of a dispute. Inappropriate
placements are likely to result from the power dynamics, psychological
tactics, and an overall failure to negotiate within the bargaining zone,
as discussed in Section II above.
A. Bargaining Zone Problems
Assuming that there are one or more points along the "appro-
priate placement" spectrum for each child, parties should actively
negotiate along that spectrum to select a placement. However, without
any objective criteria to define the bargaining zone of placements par-
ties may be unable to determine appropriate options. As agents, they
may rationalize their own desires and needs and then confound these
rationalizations with those of the child.90
1. The Unknown Bargaining Zone
Unlike the sale of a car, where the appropriate price range is
easily determined by using the Kelley Blue Book to value and compare
similar cars in similar conditions, placement decisions are made on an
individual basis with no simple starting points for the negotiating par-
ties.91 Although children with the same disability, mental capacity,
and age might have similar placement needs, the law requires that
each child be considered individually. 92 Under the law, the regular
classroom is always the presumptively appropriate placement until it
is shown otherwise.93 This presumptive placement idea is analogous to
assuming that all five-year-old cars have the same value until proven
otherwise.94 In other words, some negotiations start off with a reason-
90. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 311-12; see also Clyde v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d
1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1994).
91. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2005) (requiring an individualized education plan
be developed for each child with disabilities).
92. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (2005); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045
(5th Cir. 1989).
93. Senate Committee Report on Pub. L. No. 105-17, page 26 (noting that "the law and
this bill contain a presumption that children with disabilities are to be educated in regular
classes").
94. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 2003) (the law does not allow for a
school or parent to have its own idea of a presumptively appropriate placement for a child).
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able placement already in play, but for other children this regular
classroom setting could be entirely inappropriate. If this placement
creates in one of the parties an endowment bias or has an anchoring
effect, the result could be a long, hard fight as a result of an inappropri-
ate starting point.9 5
The lack of placement guidelines could be particularly detri-
mental to selecting an appropriate placement where parties are
making offers or demands beyond the bargaining zone. Parents of an
autistic child, for example, may seek a more expensive, more restric-
tive private school specializing in serving the autistic, even if this
restrictive setting is not substantively appropriate for their child.9 6 Al-
ternatively, they might believe that their child will become less
disabled if he spends all day in the regular classroom.97 In either case,
if the parents were to convince the school of their position, the child
could be wrongly placed.9 8 Anticipating a compromise, parents may
engage in anchoring behavior, seeking more than even they believe is
appropriate in order to achieve the desired compromised placement.
When one or the other extremes would have been appropriate, compro-
mise could result in inappropriate placement.
Like parents, schools too, may engage in anchoring behavior.
They may propose inappropriate placements for children to minimize
the costs associated with providing special classes and services, as well
as to lower the parents' expectations. If the child's appropriate place-
ment is too far from what the school has offered, and if the school
convinces the parents of its position, then the child could be wrongly
placed.
If both parties offer anchored placement proposals outside the
bargaining zone, then a compromise between these two unreasonable
positions might or might not result in an appropriate placement. It is
also possible that one party's appropriate proposal will be pulled away
from the bargaining zone by the other's anchoring behavior. 99 If par-
95. See, e.g., Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against
"Inclusion," 72 WASH. L. REV. 775, 820-24 (1997).
96. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2005) (requiring that a student be placed in the "least restrictive
environment appropriate").
97. See, e.g., Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding appropriate a
placement besides the regular classroom for a severely cognitively impaired thirteen-year-
old in regular academic classes).
98. 20 U.S.C §§ 1400-85 (2005). The law prefers students with disabilities to have the
chance to interact with non-disabled children, so the institution of disabled children would
only be appropriate in very limited circumstances. At the other extreme, if a child has
severe emotional or cognitive disabilities, it is unlikely that he would be best placed in a
class of thirty non-disabled children for all subjects.
99. See generally KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 88-91.
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ties proposed appropriate placement options, then a compromise might
not be inappropriate. In order to ensure that parties negotiate within
this bargaining zone, it is important that both parties understand the
extent of the zone.
B. Psychology and Social Norms in Placement Negotiations
When parties negotiate, they may intentionally or inadver-
tently employ psychological tactics and social factors such as reactance
behaviors, attribution biases, anchoring effects, endowment effects,
and ideas about fairness.10 0 These same tactics and behaviors may
also unknowingly affect them.101 But an educational placement deci-
sion is not a business or marketplace negotiation. Placement decisions
involve two parties negotiating on behalf of the same client, but with
different ancillary concerns. With the shared goal of appropriately
placing the child, parties ideally should be open about what place-
ments they think could be appropriate and why they think so. By
employing strategic, psychological, and social norm tactics, however,
parties may get what they want at the expense of the child's best inter-
est. The psychology of negotiation and agents' own concerns may be
incompatible with finding an objectively appropriate placement.
1. Reactance Theory
It would be inefficient and illogical for the parties to discuss
every placement available, when very few will be right for a given
child. Reactance theory,102 therefore, may explain why parents feel
mistreated in IEP negotiations when the school proposes the place-
ment without investigating what the parents' want. The school may
propose one or two placements for the child, but parents may see the
half dozen or so options not offered and their choice limited. Whether
those other placements are actually appropriate, parents may perceive
that the school is working against them. The negotiation may then end
in disagreement and require formal resolution of the placement deci-
sion, despite the law's aim of reducing disputes.103
100. See generally KOROBKIN, supra, note 15.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 102-03. Reactance theory describes why a party feels disappointed when an
option that once seemed available is no longer available, even if the party did not want that
option.
103. Though an appropriate placement will likely result from a hearing, amendments to
the IDEIA clearly prefer parties to work out placements on their own. 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(2005). Also, parties should be able to find a placement and to agree on it without being
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2. Attribution Bias
One of the most problematic psychological realities of negotia-
tions between parents and schools is that of attribution bias. 104 As a
result of the personal, entrenched positions that parties take and the
heated exchanges that can result, parties are often biased in ways that
interfere with achieving their mutual goal of selecting appropriate
placements. Parents in placement disputes often assume that the
school is unethical and unsupportive of their child's needs, even when
the school may be proposing a reasonable, appropriate placement.105
Similarly, school officials often view parents as emotionally blinded
about what is actually good for their child, either demanding place-
ments simply because they believe an expensive one must be better, or
because they are unable to accept the limitations of their child.106 As
victims of attribution bias, neither party considers that the other
party's proposal may be an appropriate one, or alternatively, that the
other party's inappropriate placement proposal is simply the result of
inadequate information. 07 This attribution bias leads to entrenched
positions that interfere with logical decision-making, discussion about
placement, and compromise or concession.108 This is evidenced by the
fact that thousands of placements result in formal disputes every
year'09 and by the well-known cases involving parents and schools that
were unable to find appropriate placements through compromise."10
swayed by their feelings, but without a clear sense of what options are actually available to
them (where the bargaining zone lies), parents are likely to react negatively to the perceived
limitation on their choice. Given the personal and sometimes emotional issues involved in
student placements, it is not surprising to see this predicted result of reactance theory in
placement negotiations.
104. See, e.g., KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 353-54.
105. Interview with parents of L.O. (Nov. 2006); Interview with parents of D.S. (Feb.,
May 2005); Welsh, supra note 52, at 622-23, 634-35.
106. Interview with A.M., Teacher (Feb. 2007); see also Welsh, supra note 52.
107. See, e.g., Alpert, supra note 62.
108. GAO Rep., supra note 1.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Beth B., 282 F.3d at 497-99; Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H.,
14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1993);
Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of
Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048-50 (5th Cir. 1989); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1983).
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3. Anchoring and Altering Perceptions of the Bargaining Zone
The strategy of anchoring is common in daily negotiations.11 1
As a result, it is to be expected that parties in placement disputes
would ask for more or offer less than what they ultimately expect to get
or believe is appropriate. In the buying and selling of a car, there is an
expectation that the buyer wants the lowest price and the seller the
highest. In placement negotiations, however, anchoring is not strategi-
cally appropriate unless the parties have already established the
bargaining zone and are making anchored offers and counteroffers
within that zone. 112 Offers and counteroffers are almost expected to be
polarized, so each party assumes that the other is willing to move to-
ward a compromise, and any unwillingness by a party to do so would
be seen as undermining the efficacy of the negotiation. 118 In placement
negotiations, however, parties are supposed to reach an objectively ap-
propriate placement, 114 and one or both parties may attempt to do so.
If one party's offer is anchored, that party may erroneously assume
that the other party's offer is as well, and that a compromise is there-
fore appropriate. If the party offering the appropriate placement
refuses to compromise, then the other party might likewise refuse to
budge, creating a standoff. Alternatively, agreement to compromise in
this situation may result in inappropriate placement of the child.115
4. Endowment Effect or Status Quo Bias1 16
The endowment effect is present in placement negotiations and
can increase a party's sense of loss if an undesired placement change
occurs.117 Parties that believe a child is appropriately placed, there-
fore, are unlikely to agree to a new placement. The status quo bias can
also affect parties by causing them to overvalue maintaining the cur-
111. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 87-91.
112. See generally KOROBKIN, supra note 15. Convincing a buyer to pay more for a car
benefits the seller without harming the buyer (since no buyer would pay more than his RP),
so the price will be within the bargaining zone. In a placement dispute, however, if
anchoring leads to a placement suggestion beyond the bargaining zone, the parties might
eventually agree to a compromise without knowing it is beyond the zone, and this to the
detriment of the child.
113. Id. at 184-85.
114. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2005).
115. Edwards, supra note 24, at 146 (noting that "the ability to come to a final
resolution does not necessarily equate to a good resolution that is appropriate for the child,
or in compliance with the requirements of FAPE").
116. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 76-80.
117. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 80. The endowment effect is the increased value an
individual assigns to objects or services once he possesses them.
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rent placement, rather than agreeing to a change.118 18 The IDEIA, in
fact, has a "stay-put" provision, 119 19 so that when a party disagrees
with the other's proposed placement, the existing placement prevails
until the dispute is resolved. The law values what the child already has
over a disagreed-upon change, 12020 thus empowering the party who
supports the current placement.
5. Splitting the Difference
Finally, social norms of fairness, such as "splitting the differ-
ence," can affect how decisions are made and what placement
results. 12 121 Because "splitting the difference" is viewed as a fair way
to come to agreements in negotiations,12222 parties in placement dis-
putes will have perceived pressure to compromise whether or not one
party actually recommends an "appropriate" placement, and a compro-
mise may move away from the appropriate placement.
Splitting the difference is often suitable in business negotia-
tions; one party might get less of the negotiated cooperative surplus,
but the deal would still be within the bargaining zone. 12323 In a place-
ment negotiation there might be a similar cooperative surplus, if there
were, for example, three appropriate placements over which to negoti-
ate. The similarity ends there, however. There is not necessarily a
reasonable middle ground between two qualitatively different yet ap-
propriate placements.12424 The bargaining zone may be a set of
distinct points, not a continuum, and so a hybrid of two appropriate
proposals could result in an educationally unworkable placement.
118. Id. at 84. When negotiating parties favor terms that do not require any action on
their part, even when they might not benefit from this, then there exists a status quo bias.
119. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2005).
120. Id.
121. KOROBKIN, supra note 15, at 354
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. For example, appropriate placements for a child needing significant individualized
attention might be taking classes in a school for students with special needs or being in a
special day class within a regular school. Spending part of the day in each school, as a
compromise or hybrid of the two appropriate placements, however, would not necessarily be
appropriate for the child.
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C. Parties Do Not Understand the Purpose and Strategies of
IDEIA Negotiation
1. Information Exchange Problems
Mediation is meant to bring about a better understanding of the
other party's position and to facilitate compromise within the bargain-
ing zone, 12525 but parties in IDEIA disputes often do not accomplish
these aims.12626 Parties may not recognize the purpose of the negotia-
tion or understand which negotiation strategies will be effective and
appropriate, and may therefore be unprepared to allow mediation to
operate effectively. Parents generally want the school to understand
their position, but worry less about understanding the school's posi-
tion.12727 Similarly, schools are more concerned with their position
being understood rather than understanding the parents' posi-
tion. 12828 Each party may view mediation as an opportunity to
persuade the other side, rather than as an opportunity to carefully con-
sider the child's best interest from all perspectives. The parties may
fail to fully explore appropriate options because they fail to listen to
each other and to understand that the purpose of the mediation is not
to serve the agents' interests, but to determine and select an appropri-
ate placement.
Failure to communicate in IDEIA mediations occurs at times
because parties attribute ulterior motives to each other, and therefore
fail to fully consider and understand the other's positions.12929 At
other times, each party is working so hard to make its own point (be-
lieving its opponent would capitulate if only it understood this party's
position) that the party fails to listen.13030 Unfortunately, information
exchange may not be used effectively to establish a bargaining zone of
appropriate placements if parties are not open to it.13131
125. KORORKIN, supra note 15, at 344-45.
126. GAO REP., supra note 1.
127. Welsh, supra note 52, at 621,627.
128. Id. at 625-28.
129. See Edwards, supra note 24, at 152.
130. Id. at 621, 633-34.
131. Edwards, supra note 24, at 153. Assuming that some parents want certain
placements for unadmitted emotional, protective reasons and that many schools want
certain placements for unadmitted administrative ease or cost-savings, an agreement based
on these stated positions may result in the best educational arrangement for the student
being obscured. Instead, these parties are likely to come to an agreement that misses the
child's educational interests in favor of the negotiators' hidden agendas. Although such a
placement could end up also being appropriate under the law, there is no assurance that
this will happen.
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2. Preparing for Negotiation
Parties need more information in order to avoid inappropriate
placements that can result from insufficient preparation and failure to
understand the purpose of negotiating placements. When each party
objectively prepares before negotiating,13232 has considered its oppo-
nent's position, and has evaluated whether these are aligned with the
child's best interest, then negotiation can be an effective way to deter-
mine placements.13333
Both parties need to look objectively at the facts and how these
facts will direct the negotiation. They must first align their own inter-
ests with those of the child. They can then begin to investigate what
sorts of placements have been used successfully for children with simi-
lar disabilities. Parties should also determine the range of possible
placements and services available within the school district.13434 In
addition, they should consider the expectations for non-disabled chil-
dren at the same grade level in order to determine where the child with
disabilities can benefit educationally. Finally, both parties need to re-
view the law to help them understand how their respective court of
appeals district currently defines "appropriate." Gathering this infor-
mation in preparation for negotiation equips each party to focus more
effectively on the interests of the child.
IV. CHANGING THE LAW To AVOID AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE THE
PLACEMENT BARGAINING ZONE
The goal of negotiating placement decisions is for the child to be
appropriately placed,13535 and therefore parents and schools together
should be enabled to find a way to do this. More information about
where the bargaining zone lies would facilitate this goal. If parties be-
gin with an objective, well-researched set of guidelines (much like the
Kelley Blue Book in used car sales), then negotiations would be more
productive. Both parties in IDEIA negotiations, theoretically, should
132. Each party also needs to engage in internal preparation, helping it to determine its
own BATNA and RP, as well as estimating its opponent's. However, without any criteria to
determine a bargaining zone, this may be difficult.
133. Alpert, supra note 62. Much literature available to parents is misleading. Some
sources instruct parents to inquire about other children's placements, despite children
needing different things. Others tell parents simply to be confrontational.
134. A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 161-63 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding
creation of a program for this child unnecessary where a specialized school was available).
This suggests that if any appropriate placement option already exists, courts are unlikely to
force a school to provide others.
135. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2005).
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want the same thing for the same client. If they were aligned as part-
ners rather than competing as adversaries, they could more effectively
focus on the child's placement, as intended by the law. 13 636 Parties'
difficulty in determining appropriate placements could be reduced if
the Department of Education were to promulgate guidelines to serve as
starting points for negotiation. An outside educational agency making
these determinations would reduce the contentiousness that perme-
ates placement decisions.
A. Department of Education Guidelines
The Department of Education currently promulgates the IDEIA
regulations and should set forth guidelines regarding appropriate
placement of children with disabilities. Parents and schools could then
consult these guidelines to determine whether their placement "offers"
or "demands" fit within the parameters of a realistic bargaining zone,
establishing a "market price." A placement agreement must be
reached, so it is essential that a bargaining zone be defined so that
parties can work toward agreeing on a substantively appropriate place-
ment for the child without the sense that the other party is being
"unfair."
1. Departmental Guidelines Would Improve Parties'
Ability to Negotiate
For the guidelines to be objective and useful, they should be
based on input from specialists in education, medicine, and disability.
For example, based on what the team of specialists might determine to
be appropriate for a student with similar needs under the guidelines,
an eleven-year-old child with severe autism might have three pre-
sumptively appropriate placements: a specialized school, a special
education class, or placement with a one-on-one aide in a regular class-
room. These objective guidelines would be advisory. They would not
completely define the range of options, but would help establish the
bargaining zone and reduce perception of mistreatment by opposing
parties.
2. Placement Disputes, Placement Challenges, and the Guidelines
If a party wanted to challenge a Department of Education sug-
gested placement offered by the other party, then it could pursue the
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq. (2005).
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traditional channels of dispute resolution. 13 737 If both of the parties
disagreed with the placement options, then they could reach an agree-
ment, place the child, and file a notice of their choice and reasons for it
with the Department of Education. This would avoid over-intervention
of bureaucratic standards and would also put some outside pressure on
parties to consider and justify why none of the recommended place-
ments were appropriate for the child.
External guidelines could improve negotiations by reducing the
extent to which schools' and parents' self-serving interests might oth-
erwise interfere with appropriate placement options. For example,
parents may unrealistically want to believe that their child is capable
of doing what others can do, and schools may want to avoid the ex-
pense of providing specialized classes or services for the child.13838 In
such a situation, the child could end up wrongly placed and learning
little in a regular classroom because the school and parents, absorbed
by their own concerns, have failed to recognize their obligations as
agents for the child. Thus, having guidelines would force the parties to
justify their placement choice, which might lead them to reconsider
such inappropriate decisions. Additionally, requiring parties to file no-
tices explaining the reasons for selecting placements, other than those
suggested, would enable the Department of Education to see where its
guidelines need to be reconsidered.
V. CONCLUSION
The IDEIA's procedural requirements, including having par-
ents and schools working together to determine what placement is best
for a child seem to work most of the time, as evidenced by the small
number of disputes each year. There are no assurances, however, that
this arrangement leads to substantively appropriate results, as par-
ents and schools are often driven by their own concerns rather than
working together for the interests of the child. Additionally, with no
alternative to trial and error for determining if a placement is appro-
priate for a child, the parties have no expert standard to determine
what would be appropriate for a child when negotiating his placement.
137. Arguably, educational placement decisions are better left to education experts than
to judges or hearing officers (see, e.g., Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 (7th Cir.
2002)), so it would make sense to have those with knowledge about children, disabilities,
and education hear placement challenges. Due to the frequent disputes about procedural
issues and other legal questions, a legal expert would also be needed. This team of experts
would ensure that placements would be sensible.
138. Edwards, supra note 24, at 153; see, e.g., Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 495-96
(7th Cir. 2002).
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While the law anticipates that having parents and schools both advo-
cate for the child will serve the child's interest, the parties' biases, lack
of information, power plays, and personal interests often interfere with
achieving that end. The parties might feel that a negotiated compro-
mise is a success without knowing where the bargaining zone of
appropriate placements lies. The result could be inappropriate for the
child. In order to serve the child's interests, parties themselves need to
objectively prepare for negotiation; and the Department of Education
needs to provide parents and schools with guidelines to establish a
starting point from which parties can determine a substantively appro-
priate placement for each child.
While guidelines will assist most parties in determining appro-
priate placements for children, creating guidelines and implementing
them could be difficult, costly, and politically thankless. One major
challenge would be to identify the sorts of experts needed to create the
guidelines. It could also be difficult to determine appropriate place-
ment for those children who do not fit the mold set out by the
guidelines. The cost of developing the guidelines could be great, but if
the guidelines reduce the number of disputes and inappropriate place-
ments, then their development would be cost-effective.
Until the Department of Education promulgates guidelines to
help parties negotiate placement within the bargaining zone, parties
will have to help themselves. By objectively assessing the child's abili-
ties, disabilities and situation, parties can begin to move themselves
into a bargaining zone of appropriate placements.
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